I.
Introduction Gilbert (2010: 164) defined ethnic militia "...as any non-state belligerent (actor) systematically fighting on the premise of ethno-nationalism (in any part of Nigeria) for the purpose of defending and projecting the interests of an ethnic nationality." The basic factor that distinguishes an ethnic militia from other forms of armed groups like cults and religious fundamentalists is that they zealously defend and project the interests of their respective ethnic nationalities, by any means, including the use of arms. Therefore, ethnic militancy is a situation whereby non-state belligerents are engaged in the act of defending and projecting the supposed interests of their ethnicities, by any possible measure, not excluding the use of arms.
The Tiv riots in the Northern region (North Central geo-political zone) marked the beginning of ethnic militancy in post-colonial Nigeria. Subsequently, there were the Agbekoya (farmers) revolt in the Western region (South West geo-political zone), the Isaac Adaka Boro-led "12 Day revolution" (South-South geopolitical zone) and the Biafran secessionist war in the Eastern region (South East geo-political zone). Nevertheless, the economic prosperity of the 1970s; the painful occurrence of the civil war -1967-1970 and the fear of the military government, combined to discourage the emergence of ethnic militancy in the post-civil war era (Gilbert, 2010) .
However, decades of authoritarianism, marginalisation, injustice and bad governance foisted on the citizenry by the Nigerian state (represented by successive military regimes), precipitated a spectre of frustration and deprivation, which triggered the formation of militant ethnic groups as extra-constitutional method for negotiation and redressing the political cum socio-economic dehumanising conditions of the people. In addition, was the failure of the newly enthroned civilian administration to meet the expectations of the Nigerian populace after several years of military dictatorship. Some of the militia groups formed were, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Arewa People's Congress (APC) and Oodua People's Congress, which emerged from the three major ethnic groups of Igbo, Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba respectively. Similarly, several other groups including Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC), the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) proliferated in the Niger Delta.
Furthermore, it has been argued that ethnic militancy emerged in the country due to the perceived marginalisation of some ethnic groups by the Nigerian state (Anifowose, 2000; Akinboye, 2001 ; Akinyele, 2001 ; Babawale, 2001) . In this context, OPC was formed specifically to fight against the political marginalisation of the Yoruba ethnic nationality; MASSOB was established for the struggle against Igbo marginalisation since the end of the civil war; FNDIC, EBA, NDPVF and MEND were also formed to struggle against the political, socio-economic and environmental marginalisation of the Ijaw ethnic group and by extension, the Niger Delta region. Jinadu (1985: 72-73 ) contends that one major characterisation (and problem synonymous with) of heterogeneous societies is the fact that the state is not usually "a neutral force in mediating political conflict", because "it can be captured and used to further the interests of the leadership of an ethnic group or combination of such groups." Awodiya (2006: 2) concurs by positing that ethnic militia groups were concentrated in the southern part of Nigeria because successive, highly centralised military regimes used political power for the lopsided authoritative allocation of resources between 1966 and 1979 and between 1984 and 1999 in the interest of the hegemonic Hausa/Fulani ethno-national group or simply the political North. The obvious implication therefore is that the political elite in the various ethnic nationalities in the south resorted to the encouragement and sponsorship of the formation of various ethnic militia groups for the advancement of their collective group interests. It is against this backdrop that this paper re-appraises the origins and dynamics of three ethnic militias in the southern part of Nigeria; namely, OPC, MASSOB and MEND. The justification for their selection is that, OPC is the only ethnic militia in the Yoruba ethnic nationality and it was also, the first ethnic militia formed in the 1990s in Nigeria. Similarly, MASSOB is the only ethnic militia in the Igbo ethnic group, while MEND is the most prominent and tenacious pan-Ijaw ethnic militia with considerable impact in the prosecution of belligerent ethno-nationalism in the Niger Delta region.
Developed from a doctoral thesis submitted to the University of KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa on ethnic militias and conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, this study is based on primary sources gathered during field trips to the Delta region, including focus group discussions, interviews with current and former militants/armed gang members, security agencies, government officials, major civil society leaders, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) staff, MNOC staff, traditional rulers, eminent journalists, Community Based Organization (CBO) leaders/members, academics, and some ordinary people of the Delta region, as well as secondary sources. With the use of the elite-instrumentalist theoretical perspective, the paper argues that among the three ethnic militia groups studied, only OPC was specifically formed and deployed by some Yoruba political elite as an instrument for the actualisation of their political objectives. The other two major militant groups in southern Nigeria, MASSOB and MEND were not formed in the context of the elite-instrumentalist perspective of ethno-nationalist rationalisation. Furthermore, it recommends the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference or an inclusive national conference whose decisions shall be subjected to a properly conducted referendum as a fundamental solution to the challenge of ethnic militancy in Nigeria.
II. Theoretical Explications
The elite-instrumentalist perspective on ethnicity (Otite, 1975; Enloe 1980; Horowitz, 1985; Diamond 1988; Osaghae, 1991; Osaghae, 1995; Auster 1996 ) is the theoretical framework on which this research work is predicated. The instrumental theory argues that ethnic identity is "created and constructed by the ethnic elite" (Eriten & Romine, n.d: 2). According to Pareto (1968: 8) elites are members of any community "who score highest on scales measuring any social value or commodity (utility) such as power, riches, knowledge". Though they usually constitute a "privileged minority" from all sectors, elites occupy prominent and important positions in any given society and "play critical roles in ethnic mobilisation" (Osaghae, 1991: 46-47) . The notion is that since the acquisition of political power is a sine qua non for access to socio-economic resources for the enhancement and reproduction of elites in most developing countries, elites resort to the politicisation and mobilisation of their ethnic groups for the "capturing" of state power; especially whenever such prospects could easily be obstructed.
Besides, this conception posits that established elites and emerging or hopeful elites as a result of their relative organisational advantage use ethnicity as a mechanism for the mobilisation of ordinary members of their ethnic group for the actualisation of their personal/group interests. More often than not, it is argued that personal interests of members of the elite are camouflaged as group interests. Ethnicity is thus a major instrument in inter-elite competition for winning and retaining political power and accessing and exploiting other socio-economic resources largely, but not solely, in favour of the elites. Eriten & Romine (n.d: 4) contend that "ethnicity is propagated and manipulated by elites, or proto-elites, aiming at either material advantages or power, or both". On the specific Nigerian case, noting that the various "ethnic grievances and demands" are clearly "elite-begotten interests", Osaghae argues that ethnicity "is epiphenomenal, as its existence is a function of the manipulations of the masses by the elite or privileged class" (2001: 4-5; 1991: 47) . Similarly, Young (1994: 77) is of the view that instrumentalism draws our attention to the "contingent, situational and circumstantial" deployment of ethnicity "in the pursuit of material advantage." Further, Ake (1996) posits that socio-economic insecurity is one of the reasons that accounts for the identification of people with their respective ethnic groups. Therefore, their impoverished socio-economic situation coupled with their poor level of enlightenment, renders them vulnerable for easy mobilisation by ethnic entrepreneurs (Kaur, 2007; Metumara, 2010) . Second is the problem of unequal development, opportunities and prospects for advancement available to different ethnic groups in a particular geopolitical system (Osaghae, 1991) . Even if such ethnicisation started off peacefully, there is always the possibility that it could turn violent if the objectives and goals of the ethnic entrepreneurs are not easily realised. It is in this context that Nnoli (1993: 6-8) observed that "under conditions of intense socio-economic competition in the society, ethnicity is associated with hostility, conflict and violence".
In the southern part of Nigeria, the high level of dissatisfaction and irritation with the repressive political and economic policies of the Nigerian state triggered the emergence of various ethno-national groups with the purported aim to protect and project the interests of their respective nationalities. People literally migrated from the non-consensual pan-Nigerian idea to their respective ethno-nationalist platforms, which some members of the political elite, used as strategic avenues of mobilisation and solidarity against perceived marginalisation and as a source of support against the politico-economic onslaught engineered by the Nigerian state. This was similar to the decisive shift of people from the pan-Nigerian nationalist fervour after independence to their respective ethno-regional bases, which were strategically deployed as instruments of struggle for resource acquisition and control in the country (Coleman, 1971; Ukeje & Adebanwi, 2008) . A situation where only the North (Hausa/Fulani) hegemonically controlled the authoritative allocation of resources due to its unbridled access to the presidency either through flawed elections or coup d"états was seriously brought into question for the first time. In his analysis, Orji (2008: 135) explained that between 1960 and 2007, the North had ruled the country in executive capacity for 412 months totalling 73.4 % of the period, while the South had governed for 148 months representing 26.1 % of the duration. Clearly, there was ample evidence to justify the agitations of the southern minorities against political marginalisation in Nigeria.
For example, as shown in Table 1 below, between 1960 and 2013, Northern Nigeria had controlled central political power (in executive capacity) for more than thirty seven years; while southern leaders have only governed for fifteen years and some months. However, as at 1999, southern political elite only had access to the presidency temporarily and by default. Groups such as MOSOP, Ethnic Minority Rights Association of Africa (EMIROAF), EBA, and OPC, therefore, emerged in the early and mid 1990s as platforms for resurgent ethnic identity politics. And "defiance to the oligarchic Hausa/Fulani-controlled Nigerian state ... became the norm" (Gilbert, 2010: 18) . Against this backdrop therefore, the paper uses the elite-instrumentalist perspective on ethnicity as the explanatory model for the re-appraisal of ethnic militancy in Nigeria. The consequent onslaught on democracy and anti-annulment activists by both the Babangida and Abacha dictatorships, and the incarceration of Abiola in June 1994, prompted Fasheun who hitherto was also a human rights activist, to resort to the mobilisation of youths for the purpose of ethnic militancy. This was in defence of the Yoruba ethnic nationality, actualisation of Abiola"s mandate, opposition of the political marginalisation of the Yoruba and fighting for self-determination for the Yoruba ethnic nationality (Akinyele, 2001 : 625-626; Sesay, etal, 2003) .
Fasheun conceded that he personally mobilised the youths to fight against the marginalisation of the Yoruba, thereby giving credence to the elite-instrumentalist perspective of ethnicity. There was therefore, no pretension about the status of OPC as a socio-cultural organisation. It's membership was not globalised but localised to the Yoruba ethnic nationality and its inter-ethnic violence against the Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Ijaw was in consonance with its ethno-nationalistic irredentism, which was clearly expressed in its objectives. It emotionally protected the interests of the Yorubas as members of its socio-cultural community, "while preying upon people outside their definition of a community" (Reno, 2006: 27) .
To give wider legitimacy, support, approval and acceptance to OPC by most Yoruba people, it was constructed on the premise of the primordial collective identity of Oduduwa, the mythical progenitor of the Yoruba nation. Its symbol was the image of Oduduwa, its anthem and motto were also based on the ancestry of Oduduwa to the Yoruba ethnic group (Akinyele, ibid). Closely related to the foregoing is the framing of OPC in the "Awolowo"s pro-poor, pro-Yoruba ideological legacy" (Guichaoua, 2006: 15) . These factors ensured speedy popularity and support for the organisation both at the grassroots and amongst the elites. And it was widely supported by renowned Yoruba nationalists such as the late Chief Michael Adekunle Ajasin (the revered leader of Afenifere and NADECO); late Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti (a notable human rights activist and Chairman of Campaign for Democracy); and late Chief Bola Ige (former governor of Old Oyo State, prominent Afenifere leader, and former Attorney General of the Federation during President Obasanjo"s first term, 1999-2003)_ (Guichaoua, 2006: 10-11) . In addition, OPC advocated for the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) of all ethnic nationalities for the restructuring of Nigeria, the review of the derivation principle of revenue allocation in favour of the producing states and the practice of true federalism in the country.
Worthy of note is the fact that OPC did not commence its militant posture until after the arrest and detention of its leader by the Abacha junta in December 1996. This incident made the OPC members feel that Nigerian problems could not be resolved peacefully. Perhaps, it was OPC"s violent ethno-nationalistic endeavours that "popularised" it nation-wide as an ethnic militia more than anything else. Second was the split of the organisation into two factions led separately by Fasheun and Gani Adams. The split was not so much about the objectives of the organisation as about how to realise them (more as a result of the controversy on how to prosecute the ethno-nationalistic fight for the realisation of the set objectives of the group). The militant ethno-nationalism of OPC instilled fear and insecurity in some northern elites who felt that the Obasanjo government was not firm enough in taming OPC and that his administration was marginalising the north. Therefore they decided on the formation of a counter group on 13 December 1999 to checkmate the activities of OPC and also fight against the perceived marginalisation of the north. Sagir Mohammed, a retired military officer became its leader. APC however, cannot be empirically described as an ethnic militia because it was not armed; it did not represent a particular ethnic nationality and did not embark on any known anti-state or inter-ethnic violent action symbolic of ethnic militias before its disintegration on 26 February 2006 (Akinyele, 2001: 633) . It was purely a pan-northern socio-cultural group. Later on, however, its ideals became subsumed under the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), a pro-Northern group that protects and projects the political interests of the entire northern part of Nigeria. In fact, in contradistinction with OPC, APF due to its varied composition lacked "the strong ethno-cultural base, appeal and cohesion of the OPC..." (Sesay, et al, 2003: 59) .
Ethnic militancy, which found expression in OPC, was deployed by some Yoruba political elite as an instrument for the actualisation of their political objectives. Vociferous violence and agitations based on ethnicity aided the achievement of their political dream of clinching the civilian presidency for the first time in the political history of Nigeria. Although initially, they (the Yoruba political elite) generally expressed a high level of resentment and cynicism towards Obasanjo, soon after, he was warmly embraced, defended and supported by renowned Yoruba political elite, who felt pacified and compensated by the occupation of the hitherto elusive presidency by their son. Even the Adam"s faction was made to come to terms with this reality, demobilised and toed the line of pacifism. Because primarily, these Yoruba elite have proved a point that: theirs is not an ethnic group that can be successfully marginalised on a prolonged basis in Nigeria"s socio-economic cum political sphere, without dire consequences for the entire polity. The enormity of the impact was such that members of the Hausa/Fulani political elite had to literally sponsor and support the presidential bid of Obasanjo, in a concessionary move to placate the Yoruba for the annulment of the June 12 presidential election, the detention and death of Abiola in controversial circumstances.
The Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)
MASSOB was established by Chief Ralph Uwazurike an Indian-trained Igbo lawyer on 13 September 1999, as an ethno-nationalist group fighting against the marginalisation of the Igbo ethnic nationality (or Ndigbo). It was established on the philosophical foundations of nonviolence, patterned after late Mahatma Ghandi, whose philosophy Uwazurike claimed to have studied for 10 years. In Uwazurike"s words: "…The main issue that led to the formation of MASSOB is the marginalisation, discrimination, elimination, subjugation of Ndigbo in Nigeria" (cited in Onuoha, 2008: 24) . Thus, MASSOB is an organisation that is basically concerned with the peaceful separation of the Igbo ethnic nationality from the Nigerian federation; it has a separatist agenda. Cognisant of the fact that the Nigerian military checkmated the original consolidation of the Biafran project, the termination of military rule and the subsequent inauguration of the 4 th republic created the long sought space for the formation of an ethno-nationalist organisation like MASSOB.
The agitation of the Igbos for a separate sovereign state distinct from Nigeria can be traced back to the deluge of political instability that occurred in the immediate post-independence era, which snowballed to the declaration of the Republic of Biafra by Lt. Col. Ojukwu on 30 May 1967 and, subsequently, the Nigerian civil war. The gory war, which claimed the lives of an estimated 3 million people, most of them Igbos, drastically altered the socio-economic and political standing of the Igbos in the Nigerian polity vis-à-vis the other two dominant groups. The war was decisively won by the Federal Military Government (FMG), which declared an unprecedented forgiveness for all Biafran belligerents. The reprieve was premised on the "no victor no vanquished" philosophical declaration of the Nigerian Head of state at the time, General Yakubu Gowon. This guaranteed the personal safety and security of lives and property of the Igbos after the civil war. Consequently, the government embarked on a policy of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (3 R"s) aimed at the reintegration of the Igbos into the Nigerian polity (Obianyo, 2007; Onuoha, 2008) .
Despite this seeming magnanimity and generosity of spirit, the Igbo perceived acts of marginalisation that were supposedly not in conformity with the public declarations of the FMG. LGAs, the North-West geopolitical zone has seven states and 188
LGAs (Onuoha, 2009). Finally, is the grievance that is predicated on the perceived general disadvantageous socio-economic cum political positions hitherto occupied by the Igbos in comparison with the other two major ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. It is against this backdrop that MASSOB was formed. Declaratively, MASSOB is a nonviolent organisation that is clamouring for the peaceful disintegration of Nigeria, in a manner similar to the collapse of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). But operatively, MASSOB is a violent ethno-national group because it has sought to impose its authority in the mobilisation and compelling of Igbos in Nigeria to compulsorily observe the annual sit-at-home order in support of the ideals of the movement, the distribution of Biafran currency and encouragement of people to adopt it as a legal tender, compelling people to observe sanitation laws, the establishment of military camps, paramilitary training of its members, sewing of Biafran military uniforms and the circulation of Biafran souvenirs such as stickers, umbrellas, belts and almanacs.
From the above, it is clear that despite MASSOB"s principle of nonviolence, it has been involved in armed militancy through the use of intimidating tactics, outright force and violence in coercing people to behave in accordance to its instructions. Thus, notwithstanding its pacifist declarations, MASSOB has apparently been using violence as a strategic instrument for the realisation of its set objectives; hence its categorisation as an ethnic militia. Secondly, MASSOB"s assertion of sovereignty over a geopolitical sphere and people that legally and internationally belong to the Nigerian state and its use of violence placed it on a collision course with the Nigerian state and provoked a backlash of security actions geared towards checkmating its activities in the South-East geopolitical zone.
Furthermore, though MASSOB is popular amongst youths, artisans, traders, unemployed, commercial cyclists and drivers, the established political elite and members of the pan-Igbo socio-cultural group, the Ohan"eze Ndi Igbo, view its activities as treasonable felony and an undue distraction from their peaceful fight against the marginalisation of the Igbos. Therefore, while the Igbo political elite are in total agreement with the fact that the Igbo ethnic nationality is being marginalised in the Nigerian polity, they disagree with the modus operandi of MASSOB. It was in consonance with this reality that the governor of Anambra state, Mr. Peter Obi, of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) political party asked for the deployment of soldiers to battle and flush out the insurgent MASSOB from the state in 2006.
Therefore, unlike OPC, MASSOB cannot be described as a ethnic militant group deployed by members of the Igbo political elite for the realisation of its collective political objectives. Against this backdrop, it defies the elite-instrumentalist perspective of ethno-nationalist rationalisation. The overt disagreement between Igbo political elite and MASSOB is a testimony to this fact. In fact, it has been argued that the emergence of ethnic militancy, which found expression in MASSOB in the South-East, is indicative of the materialisation of "an alternative project to the elite-based politics in Igboland" (Onuoha, 2009: 38) . Apparently, this is distinct from Similar to OPC and MASSOB, the formation of MEND can be rightly described as grievance-driven. However, unlike OPC, MEND was not specifically formed according to the framework of elite-instrumentalist theoretical perspective -it was not established by Ijaw political elite for the purpose of the realization of specific political objectives. It is worthy of note however, that due to its amorphous nature, some members of the political elite at various times deployed a number of supposed MEND members for personal political gains. Lastly, the fact that MEND championed the cause of resource control, coupled with the heavy-handed militaristic approach adopted by the Nigerian state, prompted several Ijaw and other Niger Delta political elite to sympathise, support and identify with the goals and travails of the militia group.
IV. Concluding Remarks and the Way Forward
The elaborate and comparative reappraisal of these three ethno-nationalist groups, OPC, MASSOB and MEND reveals that their establishment was predicated on legitimate grievance-related issues. They were founded for the articulation, prosecution and actualisation of the political and socio-economic goals of their respective ethnic group/region. Thus, ethnic militancy was deployed for the enhancement of the fortunes of their respective ethnic nationalities. However, OPC is the only ethnic militia that fits into the classical eliteinstrumentalist theoretical perspective; an ethno-nationalist organisation purposefully established by members of the political elite for the achievement of their (ethnic) political objectives. It cannot be categorically stated that the other two groups (MASSOB and MEND) were deliberately established by members of the political elite for the purpose of attaining the political goals of their respective ethnic nationalities. The support given to them by both the political elite and the generality of their respective ethnic groups further gives the impression that they were also formed by the political elite for the realisation of ethnic goals at the national level. But research proves that this is hardly true. However, as we have attempted to prove, some members of the political elite used some of the militias as instruments of personal political aggrandisement and this was a particularly worrisome feature of MEND.
In addition, two out of the three militia groups (OPC and MEND) called for the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference to discuss the possibility of restructuring the Nigerian polity. MASSOB on the other hand, is the only group with a separatist agenda; that calls for the outright but peaceful dissolution of the political entity known as Nigeria. Clearly, this is a pointer to the need for an urgent networking and collaboration by political elite in the country; for the purpose of devising a holistic approach for the resolution of the multiplicity of challenges bedevilling the Nigerian polity. And of course, a Sovereign National Conference or an inclusive national conference whose decisions will be ratified only by an appropriately conducted referendum is currently, an obvious fundamental means through which the legitimate grievances of Nigerians can be realistically addressed. If the convocation of a Sovereign National Conference is unacceptable to the incumbent government due to palpable threats to the status quo, then she should convene a national dialogue made up of the legitimate representatives of the various identifiable ethnic nationalities in Nigeria, representatives of the constitutionally recognised interest groups (civil society organisations) and perhaps, some appointed representatives of the incumbent government to discuss extensively and reasonably the myriad problems confronting Nigeria since independence with a view to amicably arriving at practicable solutions.
